摘要：

作为一种人类超越自身有限性的构想，近年来，心智上传逐渐从科幻主题成为受到学界严肃讨论的主题，并且受到公众和产业界的关注，心智上传的具体技术路线已提上了议事日程。然而，心智上传不仅存在诸多要考虑的科技难题，而且存在更根本的哲学上的困境。严肃对待心智上传技术路线的核心是全脑仿真，但这个路线却存在着一个奇怪的悖论：它出于绝对的物质主义，认为心智是物质成分之间相互作用所产生的功能；但它所体现的却是另一种信念，即心智与物质是分离的，或至少是可以分而治之的。也就是说，它实则是一种新的二元论。通过对计算功能主义的评判可以看出，心智过程本身存在不可计算的内容，与心智浑为一体的脑无法通过纯计算的方式解读，脑并不等同于计算机。因此，心智上传，至少基于心智上传的数字永生，在原则上是无法实现的。

关键词:

心智上传, 超人类主义, 技术加速主义, 计算功能主义

Abstract:

As a concept transcending human limitations, mental upload has evolved from a science fiction theme to a subject of serious academic discussion in recent years, garnering attention from the public and industry. The specific technical roadmap for mental upload has even entered the realm of policy discussions. However, mental upload faces not only numerous technological challenges but also fundamental philosophical difficulties. The crux of taking the technical route seriously lies in whole-brain simulation, rooted in absolute materialism, positing that the mind is a function arising from the interaction between material components. Paradoxically, it embodies that the mind and matter are separate, or at least divisible and governable. In essence, it is actually a new dualism. Evaluation of computational functionalism reveals that the mental process inherently contains uncomputable elements, and the brain, integrated with the mind, cannot be interpreted solely through computation. The brain is not synonymous with a computer. Consequently, mental upload, at least based on the digital immortality associated with it, is in principle unattainable.

Key words:

mental upload,  superhumanism,  technological accelerationism, computational functionalism