摘要：

数字平台因具有平台经营者和平台内市场参与者的双重身份，在实际运营中可能会给予自营的产品或服务相比于其平台内或依赖其平台的经营者更加优惠的待遇，从而对竞争效果产生损害，减损消费者福利。对于平台自我优待行为的反垄断法规制，目前学界和实务界在规制模式、分析路径等方面并未达成一致。基于平台自我优待行为的内在成因和外在表现，数字平台的自我优待行为更应被视为一种独立的滥用行为来规制。考虑到自我优待行为通常具有一定的经济效果，在对其进行反垄断法分析时，应从行为规制的角度出发，结合个案情况，对平台自我优待行为本身进行综合评估和考量。

关键词:

数字平台, 自我优待, 双重角色, 独立滥用行为

Abstract:

Digital platforms, holding the dual roles of platform operators and participants in the marketplace, may provide preferential treatment to their own products or services compared to those of third-party operators or sellers dependent on their platforms. This preferential treatment can detrimentally affect competition and diminish consumer welfare. Currently, there is no consensus within academia and industry on the regulatory framework and analytical approach to address self-preferential behavior. Based on the intrinsic causes and external manifestations of self-preferential treatment, it is argued that such behavior on digital platforms should be viewed as an independent form of abuse. Considering that self-preferential treatment typically yields certain economic effects, regulatory analysis should focus on behavioral measures and involve comprehensive evaluation based on individual cases and circumstances.

Key words:

digital platforms, self-preferential treatment, dual role, independent abuse behavior